This survey paper presents the basic concepts of cooperative game theory, at an elementary level. Five examples, including three insurance applications, are progressively developed throughout the paper The characteristic function, the core, the stable sets, the Shapley value, the Nash and Kalai-Smorodlnsky solutions are defined and computed for the different examples.
INTRODUCTION
Game theory is a collection of mathematical models to study situations of confhct and/or cooperation. It attempts to abstract out those elements that are common to many conflicting and/or cooperatwe encounters and to analyse these mathematically. Its goal is to explain, or to provide a normative guide for, rational behavlour of individuals confronted with strategic decisions or involved m socml interaction. The theory is concerned with opttmal strategic behaviour, equilibrium situations, stable outcomes, bargaining, coahtion formatlon, equitable allocations, and similar concepts related to resolvmg group &fferences The prevalence of competition m many human activities has made game theory a fundamental modeling approach in such diversified areas as economics, poht~cal science, operations research, and mdltary planning
In this survey paper, we wdl review the basic concepts of multiperson cooperative game theory, with insurance apphcat~ons in mind. The reader is first invited to ponder the five following basic examples. Those examples wdl progressively be developed throughout the paper, to introduce and Illustrate basic notions.
Example 1. United Nations Security Council
Fifteen nations belong to the United Nations Security Council five permanent members (China, France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the Umted States), and 10 nonpermanent members, on a rotating basis (m November 1990' Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Ethiopia, Finland, the Ivory Coast, Malaysia, Romania, Yemen, and Zalre). On substantwe matters, including the investigation of a dispute and the application of sanctions, ASTIN BULLETIN, Vol 21, No I decisions reqmre an affirmative vote from at least nine members, Including all five permanent members. If one permanent member votes against, a resolution does not pass. This is the famous "veto right" of the "big five," used hundreds of times since 1945. Thts veto right obviously gives each permanent member a much larger power than the nonpermanent members. But The Treasurer of ASTIN (player l) wishes to invest the amount of 1,800,000 Belgian Francs on a short term (3 months) basis. In Belgium, the annual interest rate is a function of the sum invested.
Deposit Annual Interest Rate
O-1,000,000 7 75 % 1,000,000-3,000,000 10 25 % 3,00,0,000-5,000,000 12 %
The ASTIN Treasurer contacts the Treasurers of the International Actuarial Association (I.A.A -player 2) and of the Brussels Association of Actuaries (A.A.Br. -player 3). I.A.A. agrees to deposit 900,000 francs m the common fund, A.A.Br. 300,000 francs Hence the 3-mdlion mark is reached and the interest rate will be 12% How should the interests be split among the three associations? The common practice in such situations is to award each participant in the fund the same percentage (12%). Shouldn't ASTIN however be entitled to a higher rate, on the grounds that it can achxeve a y~eld of 1025% on its own, and the others only 7.75%?
[] Example 4. Managing retention groups [BORCH (1962)] [For slmphclty, several figures are rounded in this example]. Consider a group ofn I = 100 individuals. Each of them is exposed to a possible loss of l, with a probability q~ = 0.1. Assume these persons deode to form a risk retention group, a small insurance company, to cover themselves against that risk. The premium charged will be such that the ruin probability of the group is less than 0.001. Assuming that the risks are independent, and using the normal approximation of the binomml distribution, the group must have total funds equal to
Hence each person will pay, in addition to the net premium of 0.10, a safety loading of 0.09 Another group consists of n2 = 100 persons exposed to a loss of 1 with a probablhty q2 = 0.2. If they form their own retention group under the same conditions, the total premium will be P2 = n2q2+ 3x/n2q2(1-q2) = 20+12 = 32.
Assume now that the two groups decide to join and form one single company In order to ensure that the ruin probability shall be less than 0.001, this new company must have funds amounting to PI2 = nlql+n2q2+ 3x/nlql(I-q0+n2q2(1-q2) = 10+20+ 15 = 45.
Since Piz = 45 < Pi + Pz = 51, the merger results in a decrease of 6 of the total safety loading. How should those sawngs be divided between the two groups? A traditional actuarial approach would probably consist in dividing the safety loading in proportion to the net premiums. This leads to premiums of 15 and 30, respectively. --Participants have some benefits to share (pohtlcal power, savings, or money). --This opportumty to divide benefits results from cooperation of all participants or a sub-group of participants.
--
Individuals are free to engage in negotiations, bargaining, coalition formation.
Participants have conflicting objectives; each wants to secure the largest part of the benefits for himself.
Cooperative game theory analyses those situations where participants' objectives are partially cooperative and partially conflicting. It Is In the participants' interest to cooperate, in order to achieve the greatest possible total benefits. When it comes to sharmg the benefits of cooperation, however, individuals have conflicting goals. Such situations are usually modeled as n-person cooperative games in characteristic function form, defined and illustrated m Section 2 Section 3 presents and discusses natural conditions, the mdwidual and collective rationality conditions, that narrow the set of possible outcomes. Two concepts of solution are defined: the yon Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets and the core. Section 4 is devoted to axiomatic approaches that aim at selecting a unique outcome. The main solution concept is here the Shapley value. Section 5 deals with two-person cooperative games without transferable utilities. The Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solution concepts are presented and applied to Example 5. A survey of some other solutions and concluding remarks are to be found m Sections 6 and 7.
CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTIONS
First, let us specify which situations will be considered in this paper, and some implicit assumptions.
--Participants are authorized to freely cooperate, negotmte, bargain, collude, make binding contracts with one another, form groups or subgroups, make threats, or even withdraw from the group --All participants are fully reformed about the rules of the game, the payoffs under each possible situation, all strategies available ....
--
Participants are negotiating about sharing a given commodity (such as money or political power) which is fully transferable between players and evaluated m the same way by everyone. This excludes for instance games where participants evaluate their positron by means of a concave utility function; risk aversion is not considered. (In other words, it is assumed that all individuals have linear utility functions). For this reason, the class of games defined here is called "Cooperatwe games with transferable utilities." Thts major assumption wdl be relaxed in Section 5.
Defimtion 1" An n-person game in characteristic function form F is a pair [N, v] , where N = {1,2 ..... n} is a set of n players, v is a real valued characteristic function on 2 N, the set of all subsets S of N. v assigns a real number v(S) to each subset S of N, and v(qS) = 0. Subsets S of N are called coalitions. The full set of players N is the grand coalition. Intuitively, v(S) measures the worth or power that coalition S can achieve when its members act together. Since cooperation creates savings, it is assumed that v is superaddltive, i.e., that The switch from v to v' only amounts to changing the monetary units and awarding a subsidy c, to each player. Fundamentally, this operation doesn't change anything. Hence we only need to study one game in each class of strategically equivalent games. Therefore games are often normalized by assuming that the worth of each player is zero, and that the worth of the grand coalition is 1 [In the sequel expressions such as v({l,3}) will be abbreviated as v (13) Example 1. It is easdy verified that the UN Security Council's voting rule can be modelled as a weighted majority game. Each permanent member ts awarded seven votes, cach nonpermanent member one vote. The majority required to pass a motion is 39 votes A motion can only pass Jf all five permanent members (35 votes) and at least four nonpermanent members (4 votes) are in favor Without the adhesion of all permanent members, the majority of 39 votes cannot be reached. [39; 7,7,7,7,7,l,l,l,l,l,l,l,l,l,1] Does this mean that the power of each permanent member is seven times the power of nonpermanent members? [] Example 2. Nassau County's voting procedures form the weighted majority game [58, 31, 31, 28, 21, 2 ,2] It clearly shows that numerical voting weights do not translate into political power. An inspection of all numerical posslbdttles reveals that the three least-populated municipalities have no voting power at all. Their combined total of 25 votes ~s never enough to tap the scales. To pass a motion simply reqmres the adhesion of two of the three largest districts So the assigned voting weights might just as well be ( 
~ cx, = v(N)

1=1
An imputation is an lndwldually rational payoff that allocates the maximum amount (This condition is also called "efficiency" or "Pareto-optimality"). Let us now add a third group of n 3 = 120 individual to this example, all subject to a loss of 1 with a probability q3 = 0.3. A risk retention group with a rum probablhty of .001 would require a total premium of
If all three groups decide to merge to achieve a maximum reduction of the safety loading, the total premium will be
In this case an imputation is a payoff (ctl, ct2,0~3) such that
Are all those imputations acceptable to everybody? Consider the allocation (17, 31, 39) . It is an imputation. It will however never be accepted by the first two groups Indeed they are better off withdrawing from the grand coaht~on, forming coalition (12), and agreeing for instance on a payoff (15 5, 29.5). Player 3, the third group, cannot object to this secession since, left alone, he will be stuck to a premium of 51 He will be forced to make a concession during negotiations and accept a higher ~3. ~3 needs to be at least 42 to prevent players 1 and 2 to secede This is the collective rationality condition: no coalmon should have an incentive to quit the grand coalmon. [] Definition 6. A payoff (cx I , a2, -., ~xn) is collectively rational if
Defimtion 7 The core of the game is the set of all collectively rational payoffs.
The core of a game can be empty. When it is not, it usually consists of several, or an infinity, of points. It can also be defined using the notion of dominance.
Definmon 8. 
(ill) v(S) >_ ~ L tES
So there exists a non-void set of players S, that all prefer ,8 to ~, and that has the power to enforce this allocation.
Definition 9 Imputation ,8 dominates imputation ct if there exists a coalition S such that fl dominates ~ with respect to S Definition 7' The core is the set of all the undominated imputations.
Definitions 7 and 7' are equivalent.
Example 4. (Retention groups). The core ~s the set of all payoffs that allocate the total premium of 87, while satisfying the 3 individual and 3 collective ratlonahty conditions. Despite its intuitive appeal, the core was historically not the first concept that attempted to reduce the set of acceptable payoffs with rationality conditions. In their path-breaking work, VON NEUMANN and MORGEN-STERN (1945) Stable sets are however usually very difficult to compute The main drawback of the core and the stable sets seems to be that, in most cases, they contain an infinity of allocations For instance, the core and the stable set of all 2-person games simply consist of all imputations It would be preferable to be able to single out a umque, "fair" payoff for each game Thls is what the Shapley value achieves 4 THE SHAPLEY VALUE Example 3. (ASTIN money). Assume the ASTIN Treasurer decides to initiate the coalition formation process. Playing alone, he would make v(l) = 46,125. If player 2 decides to join, coalition (12) will make v(12) = 69,187.5. Assume player 1 agrees to award player 2 the enhre benefits of cooperation; player 2 receives his entire admission value v(12)-v(l) = 23,062.5. Player 3 joins in a second stage, and increases the total gain to 90,000. If he is allowed to keep his entire admission value v(123)-v(12) = 20,812.5, we obtain the payoff [46,125; 23,062.5; 20,812.5] This allocation of course depends on the order of formation of the grand coalition. If player 1 joins first, then player 3, and finally player 2, and if everyone keeps his entire admission value, the following payoff results [46,125, 36,187.5, 7,687.5] The four other player permutations [ (213), (231), (312), (321) Payoffs resulting from two distinct games should be added. While the first two axioms seem quite justified, the latter has been criticized It rules out all interactions between the two games, for instance. Shapley has shown that one and only one allocation satisfies the three axioms
where s is the number of members of a coalition S
The Shapley value can be mterpreted as the mathematical expectation of the admission value, when all orders of formation of the grand coalition are equiprobable. In computing the value, one can assume, for convenience, that all players enter the grand coaht~on one by one, each of them receiving the entire benefits he brings to the coalition formed just before him. All orders of formation of N are considered and intervene with the same weight 1/n! in the computation. The combinatorial coefficient results from the fact that there are (s-1)! (n-s) I ways for a player to be the last to enter coalition S' the s-1 other players of S and the n-s players of N"NS can be permuted without affecting Cs position In a two-player game, the Shapley value is
It is the middle of the segment ocl +o¢2 = v(12), ~z¿ >-v(1), a2 >-v(2). This is illustrated in Figure 1 . Example 1. (UN Security Council). In a weighted malonty game, the admission value of a player is either 0 or 1. One simply has to compute the probability that a player clinches victory for a motion. In the UN Security Council game, the power of a nonpermanent member t is the probablhty that he enters ninth in any coalition that already includes the five permanent members It is The Shapley value may lie outside the core In the important subclass of convex games, however, it wdl always be in the core.
Definmon 11. A game is convex if, for all S -~ T_c N, for all :¢ T, v(TOi)-v(T) >_ v(SOO-v(S).
A game is convex when it produces large econonues of scale, a "snow-balhng" effect makes ~t increasingly interesting to enter a coalition as ~ts number of members increases. In particular, ~t ~s always preferable to be the last to enter the grand coaht~on N. The core of convex games ~s always non-void. Furthermore, ~t coincides with the unique yon Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. It is a compact convex polyhedron, of dimension at most n-1 The Shapley value lies m the center of the core, in the sense that it is the center of gravity of the core's external points. In this figure the axes measure the respective variance reductions, p~ and P2-Point 2 corresponds to ct =/3 = 0 4. It dominates point 1, since it leads to a greater variance reduction for both companies. Point 3 is 7 = 0.53,/3 = 0.47, ~t dominates points 1 and 2. It can be shown that no point can dominate point 3, and that all treaties such that ct+/3 = 1 neither dominate nor are dominated by point 3. For instance, point 4 (ct = 0.7,/3 = 0.3) will be preferred to point 3 by . M, the game space, is a convex compact set in the twodimensional space E 2 of the players' utilities; it represents all the payoffs that can be achieved.
Such a game is often called a two-person bargaining game Let B be the set of all pairs (M, d). Since no player will accept a final payoff that does not satisfy the individual rationality condition, M can be hmited to the set of points (Pl,P2) such that p~ > d~ and P2 > d2. Our goal is to select a unique payoff in M. This axiom is hard to argue with. It only reflects the reformation contained m utility functions. Since utilities are only defined up to linear transformations, ~t should be the same for solutions.
Axtom 2. Symmetry
All symmetric games have a symmetric solution. A game is symmetric if dl = d2 and (p~, P2) ~ M ~ (P2, P0 ~ M The axiom requires that, in this case,
f,(M, d) = f2 (M, d).
Like axiom 1, axiom 2 requires that the solution only depends on the information contained in the model A permutation of the two players should not modify the solution, if they cannot be differentiated by the rules of the game. Two players with the same utility function and the same mmal wealth should receive the same payoff if the game space Is symmetric.
Axiom 3. Pareto-optimality
The solution should be on the Pareto-optlmal curve For all (M, d)~ B, if p and qE M are such that q, > p, (t = 1,2), then p cannot be the solution:
Axiom 4. Independence of irrelevant alternatives
The solution does not change ~f we remove from the game space any point other than the &sagreement point and the solution itself. Let (M, d) and
This axiom formahzes the negotmt~on procedure. It requires that the solution, which by axiom 3 must lie on the upper boundary of the game space, depends on the shape of this boundary only in its nelghbourhood, and not on &stant points. It expresses the fact that, during negotiations, the set of the alternatives likely to be selected ~s progressively reduced. At the end, the solution only competes with very close points, and not with proposals already eliminated during the first phases of the discussion. Nash's axioms thus model a bargaining procedure that proceeds by narrowing down the set of acceptable points. Each player makes concessions until the final point ~s selected. NASH (1950) has shown that one and only one point satisfies the four axioms. It is the point that maximizes the product of the two players' utility gains. Nash's solution is the function f, defined by f (M, d) It is slightly more favourable to player 2 than Nash's solution.
[]
OTHER SOLUTION CONCEPTS --OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE
Stable sets and the core are the most important solution concepts of game theory that attempt to reduce the number of acceptable allocations by introducing intuitive condmons. Both notions however can be criticized. Stable sets are difficult to compute. Some games have no stable sets. Some others have several. Moreover, the dominance relation is neither antlsymmetnc nor transitive It is for instance possible that an imputation fl dominates an imputation 0~ with respect to one coahtlon, while cx dominates fl with respect to another coahtmn Therefore an imputation inside a stable set may be dominated by an imputation outside.
The concept of core is appealing, because it satisfies very intmtlve rationality conditions. However, there exists vast classes of games that have an empty core: the rationahty conditions are conflicting. Moreover, several examples have been built for which the core provides a counter-intuitive payoff, as shown in Example 6. Example 6. A pair of shoes Player 1 owns a left shoe. Players 2 and 3 each own a right shoe. A pair can be sold for $ 100. How much should 1 receive if the pair is sold? Surprisingly, the core totally falls to catch the threat posstbllmes of coafitton (23) and selects the paradoxical allotment (100, 0, 0). Any payoff that awards a positive amount to 2 or 3 is dominated, for instance (99, 1, 0) is dominated by (99.5, 0, 0.5).
JEAN LEMA1RE
Moreover, the paradox remains tf we assume that there are 999 left shoes and 1000 right shoes. The game is now nearly symmetrical, but the owners of right shoes stdl receive nothing. The Shapley value is (66%, 16%, 16%), defimtely a much better representation of the power of each player than the core.
[] Many researchers feel that the core is too static a concept, that it does not take into account the real dynamics of the bargaining process. In addition, laboratory experiments consistently produce payoffs that lie outside the core. This led AUMANN and MASCHLER (1964) to define the bargaining set. Th~s set exphcitly recognizes the fact that a negotiation process ~s a mulh-criterla situation. Players definitely attempt to maxim~se their payoff, but also try to enter into a "safe" or "stable" coahtion. Very often, ~t 1s observed that players willingly give up some of their profits to join a coalition that they think has fewer chances to fall apart. This behavlour is modelled through a dynamic process of" threats" and "counter-threats." A payoff is then considered stable if all objections against it can be answered by counter-objections Example 7. Consider the three-person game
The core of this game is empty. For instance, the players will not agree on an allocation like [75, 25, 0] , because it is dormnated by [76, 0, 24] . Bargaimng set theory, on the other hand, claims that such a payoff is stable. If player 1 threatens 2 of a payoff [76, 0, 24] , this objection can be met with the counter-objection [0, 25, 25] . Player 2 shows that, without the help of player 1, he can protect his payoff of 25, whde player 3 receives more in the counter-objection than in the objection. Similarly, objechon [0, 27, 23] of player 2 against [75, 25, 0] can be counter-obJected by [75, 0, 25] . So, if a proposal [75, 25, 0] arises during the bargaining process, it is probable that it wdl be selected as final payoff. Any objection, by either player l or player 2, can be countered by the other. On the other hand, a proposal hke [80, 20, 0] 1s unstable. Player 2 can object that he and player 3 will get more in [0, 21, 29] . Player 1 has no counter-objection, because he cannot keep his 80 whde offering player 3 at least 29
Thus, in addition to all undominated payoffs (the core), the bargalmng set also contains all payoffs against which there exists objections, providing they can be met by counter-objections The bargaining set for this example consists of the four points [0, o, o 1968, 1982) or AUMANN and MASCHLER (1964) . In 1965, DAVIS and MASCHLER defined the kernel of a game, a subset of the bargaimng set. In 1969, SCHMEIDLER introduced the nucleolus, a unique payoff, included m the kernel. It ~s defined as the allocation that mlnimises successively the largest coalitional excesses
The excess is the difference between a payoff a coalition can achieve and the proposed allocation. Hence it measures the amount ("the size of the complaint") by which coalition S as a group falls short of its potential v(S) in allocation ~ If the excess is positive, the payoff ~s outside the core (and so the nucleolus exists even when the core is empty). If the excess is negative, the proposed allocation Is acceptable, but the coalition nevertheless has interest m obtaining the smallest possible e(~, S) The nucleolus ~s the imputation that minimises (lex~cographically) the maximal excess. Since it is as far away as possible of the rationality conditions, it lies in the middle of the core. It is computed by solving a finite sequence of linear programs. Variants of the nucleolus, hke the proportional and the &srupt~ve nucleolus, are surveyed among others m LEMAIRE (1983). The proportional nucleolus, for instance, results when the excesses are defined as
Since it conststs of a single point, the nucleolus (also called the lexicographic center) prowdes an alternatwe to the Shapley value. The Shapley value has been subjected to some criticisms, mainly focussing on the ad&tivlty axiom and the fact that people joining a coahtion receive their full admission value.
Example 3. (ASTIN money). The Shapley value, computed in Section 4, is [51,750 ; 25,875 ; 12,375] It awards an interest of 11.5% to ASTIN and I.A.A., and 16.5% to A.A.Br. This allocation is much too generous towards A.A.Br.'s Treasurer, who takes a great advantage from the fact that he ts essential to reach the 3-milhon mark. His admission value is extremely high (m proportion to the funds supphed) when he comes in last. The nucleolus is [52,687.5; 24,937.5; 12,375] or, in percentages ROTH (1980) is devoted entirely to this case. It provides a thorough analysms of Nash's and Kalm-Smorodlnsky's solutions. The generalisatlon of those models to the n-person case has proved to be very difficult. In the two-person case, the disagreement point is well defined : ff the players don't agree, they are left alone. In the n-person case, if a general agreement m the grand coalitton cannot be reached, sub-coalmons may form Also, some players may wish to explore other avenues, like possible business partners outside the closed circle of the n players. This xs an objection against modeling market situauons as non-transferable n-person games. Such games ignore external opportumties, such as competitive outsxde elements See SHAPLE¥ (1964 ) and LEMAIRE (1974 , 1979 for definitions of values in the n-player case.
Though somewhat dated by now, the book by LUCE and RAIVVA (1957) is still an excellent mtroducuon to game theory and utthty theory. It provides an insightful critical analysis of the most important concepts An excellent book that surveys recent developments is OwEN (1968 OwEN ( , 1982 , especially the second edition). A booklet edited by LUCAS (1981) provides an interesting, simple, abundantly illustrated analysis of the basics of cooperaUve and non-cooperative game theory. Finally, the proceedings of a conference on apphed game theory [BRAMS, SCHOTTER, SCHWODIAUER (1979) ] provide a fascinating overview (from a strategic analysis of the Bible to the mating of crabs) of apphcaUons of the theory. 1979) ]. The ASTIN Bulletin has yet to find a third author attracted by game theory! It is hoped that this survey paper will contribute to disseminate some knowledge about the situations game theory models, so that the risk exchange model will not stand for a long time as ~ts lone actuarial application.
